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Editor’s Note: The majority of the articles in this issue address 
safety and prevention programs and policies that have devel-
oped since the inception of the Coast Guard and are at the 
core of its mission. Today, that mission has evolved to include 
safety and prevention in cyberspace. It is feasible that when 
Proceedings marks its 100th anniversary, cybersecurity be as 
much a core safety and prevention mission as ice breaking. This 
article describes the cybersecurity challenges and strategies 
currently facing the maritime industry.
I n 2017 and 2018, the maritime industry saw a record number of attempted—and many successful—frauds via email, phishing, or other means. Demonstrated 
and actual attacks on vessel networks, communication 
systems, and navigation systems have become practically 
routine. Port and shipping line networks are increasingly 
vulnerable to what appears to be increasingly targeted 
attacks against maritime systems.
The global marine transportation system (MTS) 
is huge, complex, and uses myriad technologies with 
a wide range of sophistication. Maritime systems are 
commonly designed to accommodate predictable fail-
ures—e.g., material fatigue due to age and use—but not 
intelligent actors. There is, and can be, no central man-
agement of maritime cyber systems, hence every player 
has to manage their own network and protect themselves 
from everyone else. Of course, the maritime industry has 
some of its own unique cyber vulnerabilities.
An Overview of the Maritime Cyber Landscape
The United States’ marine transportation system includes 
25,000 miles of navigable channels and waterways, more 
than 4,100 ports and marinas, 200 ferry operations, and 
238 locks. It also includes 12 million recreational boats 
and tens of thousands of commercial, merchant, military, 
municipal, and other vessels. Shipping, the method by 
which 90 percent of global trade moves, is also this coun-
try’s primary mode of transportation for the import and 
export of goods.
Information security threats to the maritime industry 
are not much different than threats to the general world 
of computer and network technology. Viruses, worms, 
and other forms of malicious software, or malware, 
affect the industry even when shipping is not the direct 
target. Stuxnet, for example, the circa-2009 malware 
targeting centrifuges used in Iranian nuclear research 
facilities, was also found in control systems at Chevron. 1
NotPetya, the ransomware virus that spread across the 
planet in a matter of hours in May 2017, cost Maersk Line 
as much as $300 million in lost revenue, forcing them to 
rebuild nearly 50,000 servers and user computers—and 
Maersk wasn’t even a target, merely vulnerable. 2 
This is not to say that the maritime industry has not 
been targeted. Advanced persistent threats (APT)—a 
class of attack first described in 2010—are cyberattacks 
targeting a specific victim using sophisticated, dynamic 
methods that adapt to the victim’s defenses, and are often 
state-sponsored. Reports in 2018 showed that Chinese-
linked APTs had been targeting the maritime industry 
since 2013, with particular escalation in 2017. 3 
Cyberattacks on maritime information technology 
(IT) systems have been ongoing for some time. Hackers 
broke into Australian Customs and Border Protection 
Service cargo management systems in 2012 to track illicit 
cargo, allowing them to alert criminals if their particular 
containers had been marked as suspicious by the cus-
toms service. From 2011–2013, hackers used a variety 
of methods to break into Port of Antwerp the computer 
systems controlling movement and location of shipping 
containers, allowing criminals to generate bogus bills of 
lading, allowing them to remove cargo containers before 
the legitimate owner arrived. 4 In 2016, hackers exploited 
one shipping company’s content management system, 
allowing pirates to identify specific containers on spe-
cific vessels, enabling them to target desired cargo ships 
and get on and off the vessel in a matter of hours. 5 
Cyberfraud is also a serious concern in the indus-
try due to the high volume of communications, orders, 
and financial transactions that occur online. In 2014, 
World Fuel Services was defrauded of $17.9 million by a 
bogus fuel order, and a Malaysian bunker company was 
defrauded of more than $1 million in a phishing scheme. 6 
In 2015, a shipping company in Cyprus received a fuel 
bill for $644,000 with a request to send the payment to a 
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origin into a computer, or not keeping up-to-date with 
anti-malware software—causes most cyber incidents. 
Even worse, intentional human attackers, including 
cybercriminals, cyberspies, and state-sponsored cyber-
terrorists, prey upon this lack of vigilance to force and/
or exploit those human and system errors.
One result of the interconnectedness of networks 
within a system is that one network provides a path 
to other networks. For example, in late 2017 maritime 
cyber consulting company Naval Dome reported on 
multiple vulnerabilities in a shipboard network. 8 In one 
case, malware was inserted into the vessel’s Electronic 
Chart Display and Information System (ECDIS) via a 
satellite link to the master’s computer. Unbeknownst to 
the crew, the malware altered the ship’s position during 
the night without changing the ECDIS display. A second 
piece of malware was uploaded to the radar system via 
the network switch that connected radar, ECDIS, bridge, 
and other ship communication systems. This malware 
altered the radar display by deleting targets on the dis-
play, essentially blinding the ship. The final malware was 
inserted into the machinery control systems network via 
an infected thumb drive.
At another level, the issue lies not in protecting an 
individual system or network, but in the difficulty of 
protecting the broader system of systems and the inher-
ent complexities therein. The networks throughout the 
MTS are ultimately interconnected, so the ripple effect of 
an attack on one part of the system might be felt in other 
parts. Even if every component within a single system 
or network was proven to be totally immune to attack, it 
would be impossible to ensure the security of all of those 
interconnected components. This is further complicated 
by the fact that no organization has any control over the 
other networks with which they interact. A common 
strategy of groups engaged in an APT is to probe and 
perform reconnaissance to find the weakest link in a set 
different bank account than usual. A criminal had sent 
a bogus bill for a legitimate order and misdirected the 
funds to their account. 7 
Presumably, every IT system manager in the indus-
try has taken steps to protect their computers, servers, 
mobile devices, control systems, and other digital equip-
ment from the threats associated with poor cybersecurity. 
Even so, cybersecurity policies and procedures specific 
to the maritime industry are still in the early stages, and 
there is only a very limited systematic response.
The Maritime IT System of Systems
There are myriad IT systems, components, vendors, 
jurisdictions, and manufacturers, as well as organiza-
tional policies, procedures, and requirements within the 
MTS. It is this diversity that makes protecting maritime 
IT assets from cyberthreats so difficult. Consider that the 
maritime system and industry comprises the following 
components and vulnerabilities:
• Seaport operations, including vessel control and 
traffic management, personnel management and 
screening, passenger management and passport 
control, WiFi and physical networks
• Cargo and shipping, including logistics, supply 
chain, routing, scheduling, loss management
• Manufacturing, including intellectual property 
theft, supply chain, payment systems, software 
and hardware flaws
• Vessel traffic management, including ship 
management, routing, communication, location 
management and communication
• Shipping line operations, including passenger 
information, reservation systems, 
communication, baggage and cargo handling, 
maintenance, catering, payment systems
• Vessel operations, including the ship’s onboard 
network architecture providing interconnection 
between the bridge navigation, communication, 
mechanical, ship monitoring and security, cargo 
handling and other specialized systems, and 
communication with external networks with 
regards to vessel traffic management, ports, and 
shipping lines
• Unmanned/autonomous vehicles, including 
remote control or monitoring, GPS hacking and 
jamming, hardware and software flaws
At one level, these individual systems can be thought 
of as regular computers and networks. They are therefore 
susceptible to the same threats as any other computer 
or network, especially when it comes to human “weak 
links” in the system who will make errors or don’t follow 
processes and procedures. Indeed, human error—click-
ing on a fateful web link, opening a malware attachment 
in an email, plugging a USB thumb drive of unknown 
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of interconnected networks, or to attack a target’s sup-
ply chain partners, in order to identify a pathway to the 
ultimate target. 9 
Cyber Threats to Navigation Systems
The global positioning system (GPS) and other global 
navigation satellite systems (GNSS) are essential ele-
ments to safety within the MTS. In addition to its 
obvious uses in navigation and ship positioning, GPS 
provides data for the placement of aids to navigation, 
chart surveys, ECDIS displays, and radar. GPS signals 
are transmitted from medium Earth orbit satellites at 
an altitude of 12,000–15,000 miles. Overpowering these 
relatively weak, unencrypted signals is not hard. In 2013, 
a University of Texas at Austin team demonstrated the 
ability to spoof GPS signals to cause a ship’s crew to devi-
ate course in a proof-of-concept experiment using off-
the-shelf equipment. 10 
Deliberate GPS spoofing attacks have caused ships’ 
equipment to misreport—or lose—their own position 
or that of other ships. In June 2017, a mass GPS spoofing 
incident in the Black Sea targeted ships off the Russian 
port of Novorossiysk, causing their GPS-based navi-
gation systems to report their location up to 25 miles 
away at the Gelendzhik Airport. A secondary side effect 
involved the ships’ automatic identification systems 
(AIS) broadcast alerts as they found themselves within 
100 meters of at least a dozen other 
ships—all believing that they were 
at the same airport. This incident 
was thought to be the result of a 
Russian electronic warfare exer-
cise. 11 These types of activities con-
tinue, with multiple GPS spoofing 
incidents reported in the eastern 
Mediterranean Sea during the first 
half of 2018. 12 
The AIS is a GPS-based vessel 
tracking system providing a ship’s 
unique identifier, position, course, 
speed, and other information. In a 
busy harbor or traffic lane, it broad-
casts a ship’s position and displays 
the location of other ships in the area. Cybersecurity solu-
tions company TrendMicro has reported on several vul-
nerabilities in AIS, including the lack of message validity, 
integrity, authentication, and timing checks, and lack of 
encryption. 13 AIS also responds to abnormal events. For 
example, an attacker could cause a ship’s crew to change 
course by spoofing the AIS’ closest point of approach 
(CPA) warning, another ship’s AIS distress beacon, or 
dynamic weather information. There are many reasons 
an attacker might want to divert a ship—from want-
ing to run it aground, to bringing it closer to pirates, to 
charging a ransom to not do these things.
Several public websites and smartphone apps allow 
anyone to find the current location of any vessel broad-
casting its AIS information. The International Maritime 
Organization (IMO) Maritime Safety Committee warned 
against the dangers of AIS-based information leakage 
as far back as 2004. Even then, the IMO recognized that 
posting AIS on web pages and other public sites had 
the potential to undermine the safety of navigation and 
security in the international MTS. 14 
Cyber Threats to Autonomous and Smart Systems
The introduction and growing use of automation in ships, 
ports, cargo, operations, and other maritime systems has 
added tremendous efficiencies and cost savings. It has 
also removed the possibility of human interference from 
many aspects of the redundancy and control loop.
A growing trend in the MTS 
is the development of so-called 
smart ports, largely using internet 
of things (IoT) technology. Smart 
ports use network-attached sensors 
to monitor tide, current, tempera-
ture, wind direction/speed, water 
depths, visibility, berth availability, 
and other data, feeding a central-
ized information dashboard to con-
nected vessels. This type of system 
can streamline port operations to 
reduce wait times; optimize dock, 
load, and unload times; and maxi-
mize the number of vessels that 
can be managed efficiently, allow-
ing the port and shippers to save significant amounts of 
money. Security, however, is not built into the design and 
development of these low-cost IoT devices, making them 
notoriously subject to network-based attacks. The mas-
sive distributed denial-of-service in 2016 against domain 
name and email service provider Dyn, for example, was 
due to a botnet—an automated attack network—com-
prising more than 100,000 such devices. 15 
Autonomous and remote-controlled vessels and 
port vehicles are another growing trend in the mari-
time industry, as witnessed by the Maritime Unmanned 
Eugenius777 | Shutterstock.com
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billionth of a second—error  
is equivalent to approximately  
one foot of positioning error. 
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vessel of people with infections to a public dock, why 
would we not quarantine a vessel with a network virus, 
prevent them from connecting to a port’s network? We 
need to take seriously cyberthreats to vessels, ports, and 
other parts of the MTS, and isolate “sick” entities from 
the “healthy” ones. 18 
Conclusion
The maritime industry is constantly evolving to 
become more advanced, compared to its ancient roots. 
Unfortunately, many old technologies, processes, and 
procedures in place today haven’t kept up, causing some 
executives in the industry to observe that the maritime 
industry is 30 to 500 years behind in terms of technol-
ogy.19 This makes it difficult to keep up with the rapid 
acceleration of change—not only the adoption of new 
technology, but of understanding the vulnerabilities, 
exploits, and risks of emerging technologies.
A number of maritime industry organizations 
are responding to cyberthreats via suggested poli-
cies and procedures. The Baltic and International 
Maritime Council guidelines for vessel cybersecurity, 
for example, take a risk management approach to ves-
sel cybersecurity. 20 The American Bureau of Shipping 
guidelines apply best practice cybersecurity principles to 
ships and other maritime platforms, as well as the land-
side systems that support them. 21 The National Institute 
of Standards and Technology, in conjunction with the 
U.S. Coast Guard, has added maritime-specific profiles to 
its widely used cybersecurity framework documents. 22
Indeed, the USCG Academy started a cyber systems 
major in fall 2018, their first new major in 20 years. 23
In addition, a private company specializing in testing, 
Navigation through Intelligence in Networks initiative 
and projects being led by organizations like Massterly, 
Rolls-Royce, the Port of Long Beach, and the Maritime 
Port Authority of Singapore. The technology that would 
support this level of automation is definitely in place, but 
what is missing is enough trust that these systems can-
not be compromised via network attacks. 16 
Cyberphysical Threats
Cyberattacks are generally thought of as events that 
use a cybervector towards a cybertarget. Cyberphysical 
threats specifically address the case where the cyber vec-
tor is targeting a physical asset. Indeed, cyberphysical 
systems, defined as those that integrate computers and 
physical components, are increasingly common in all 
aspects of our lives as we develop more sophisticated 
sensors, instruments, networks, and embedded comput-
ers. 17 In the MTS environment, consider the situation 
if cyberterrorists were to gain control of autonomous 
vehicles at a port and use them to “attack” people or 
damage equipment at the port.
More worrisome is the case of gaining access to a 
ship’s navigation, propulsion, or ballast system. If a ship 
could be deliberately grounded in any number of critical 
locations, the increase in shipping costs caused by delays 
or rerouting would be enormous, not to mention the cost 
to repair damaged facilities. If an attacker could alter 
sensors, gauges, or containment systems on a vessel car-
rying potentially hazardous materials, it might be pos-
sible to create a spill, explosion, or other adverse action.
Ultimately, all cyberattacks have a physical tar-
get, whether directly or indirectly. What has not been 
addressed yet is this scenario: If we would not allow a 
Zapp2Photo  | Shutterstock.com
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inspection, and certification, has released cybersecurity 
guidelines addressing software management and secure 
ship-to-shore communication. 24 
Despite all of these measures, a 2017 industry sur-
vey about maritime cybersecurity revealed a disparity 
between management and crewmembers. While two-
thirds of executives and managers think their organi-
zation provides cybersecurity awareness for crew and 
staff, less than half of the crew and staff respondents still 
think they receive adequate training. And, while only 
a third of executives identified insiders as the biggest 
cybersecurity threat, half the managers and two-thirds 
of the crew and staff disagreed. 25 
None of the observations made here are a surprise to 
most cybersecurity professionals. The marriage of the 
maritime industry and technology is as important as it 
is inevitable. Facilitation of open discussions will help 
the industry better prepare for and address information 
risks inherent with cybersecurity attacks. 
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